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Abstract Supporters of term limits argued that they would decrease interest group 
influence. Using data from 24 states from 1998 to 2008, this paper finds that this 
assumption is not the case. This analysis finds that states with term limits have higher 
numbers of lobbyists and campaign contributions than those states without term limits. 
This suggests that interest groups have become more entrenched in term limited states 
and have become more influence in the inexperience legislatures. 
1 
Introduction  
Citizens have always wanted to be more influential in government, especially 
when the government enacts policies that contradict their preferences.  Other than 
elections, the only way for society to directly influence policy is through initiatives and 
referendums.  In the 1990s, the voters of many states used their power to pass initiatives 
to enact term limits on the members of their state legislatures.  Over the years people 
have become increasingly disaffected by government and passed term limits as a result 
(Pomper and Weiner 127).  This disaffection, though, was occurring throughout the entire 
nation.  
In 2006 there were 15 states with term limits, but no other states have had term 
limits enacted since 2000 (National Conference of State Legislatures 2006).  They were 
enacted in three states in 1990, eight in 1992, one each in 1993, 1995 and 1996, and most 
recently in 2000 (National Conference of State Legislatures 2006) (see table 1).  There 
were several underlying reasons why the citizens enacted term limits. For the most part, 
the citizens wanted the government to be responsive to their needs and not the needs of 
interest groups.  
Term limits were extremely popular, so after they were enacted in the first few 
states, other states followed suit.  This phenomenon also created an influx of research on 
term limits and citizens’ dissatisfaction with government.  However, it did not take long 
for the allure of term limits to subside.  After the fascination diminished, so did the study 
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of term limits. What research continues only examines term limits on a state by state 
basis, instead of nationally.  
Term limits sparked a dramatic change in many states across the nation. However, 
most political scientists only examine the theoretical consequences of term limits.  Very 
little has been done to determine the actual effects of term limits and whether or not the 
desired ones have occurred.  I examine the effects that term limits have had on interest 
group influence in the state legislatures.  I will examine literature that has been written on 
term limits and discuss the theories on their effects, including but not limited to interest 
group influence.  
This paper examines the ways that interest groups influence state legislatures and 
will determine whether or not term limits have had an effect on those practices. Term 
limits have increased turnover rates, given more power to the executive branch and 
lobbyists, and have produced an inexperienced and less productive legislature (Bennett 
2005; Birkholz 2005; Daggett 2005; Flake 2005; Moncrief 2005; and Rockefeller 2005).   
I hypothesize that term limits will increase the activity of interest groups.  This 
hypothesis is in opposition to what term limit proponents would desire and against the 
arguments put forth. As stated earlier, citizens imposed term limits to stop interest 
groups; accordingly, interest groups should have less clout over legislatures.   
To better understand term limits, I begin with a more detailed history of them. 
This section will explain the variations between different term limits imposed by states’ 
citizens. Afterward, I discuss the different theories on term limits and interest groups and 
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include testimony from former state government officials. Then, I describe my 
methodology for testing my hypothesis and provide the results of the regression. Finally, 
I summarize my findings, discuss any shortcomings and suggest any changes that need to 
occur.  
History of Term Limits 
The idea of term limits is nothing new. Term limits were first proposed during the 
first Congress of the United States but the amendments proposed were not ratified (Fett 
and Ponder 1993, 211). The issue was not considered again until 1943 (Fett and Ponder, 
1993, 211). Interest continued to grow and from 1981 to 1992 more than 69 proposals 
were introduced to limit the tenure of Congressional members (Fett and Ponder 1993, 
211; Petracca 1993, 701). By 1993, 15 states had passed amendments to their 
constitutions to limit the tenure of their United States representatives and senators (Fett 
and Ponder 1993, 211; Petracca 1993, 700). This, however, did not last long. In 1995, the 
Supreme Court ruled, in a 5-4 vote, that term limits on members of Congress were 
unconstitutional (U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton 1995). The Court argued that states do 
not have it within their power to change the tenure of members of Congress (U.S Term 
Limits v. Thornton 1995).  
Even though the push for Congressional term limits was over, state term limits had 
just begun. In 1990 California, Oklahoma and Colorado had initiatives passed to limit the 
tenure of state legislators (Kurtz, Cain, and Niemi 2007, 12). Once those states enacted 
term limits the ball had been set in motion and 18 other states adopted similar initiatives 
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(Bowser, Chi, and Little 2006, 19).  Not long after term limits were passed, the supreme 
courts of four states, Massachusetts, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming, declared they 
were unconstitutional (National Conference of State Legislatures 2006). Massachusetts, 
Washington, and Wyoming’s supreme courts ruled that it was impermissible to establish 
qualifications for holding government office in the statutes (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 2006). Initiatives passed in Oregon can only change a single subject of the 
constitution. The Oregon Supreme Court ruled term limits unconstitutional because the 
initiative addressed more than one section of the state’s constitution, which violated the 
single-subject rule (National Conference of State Legislatures 2006). Two other state 
legislatures, Idaho and Utah, repealed their term limits (Bowser, Chi, and Little 2006, 21-
22).   
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1 Term limits were effective in 2000 for eight current members of the House and one Senator in 1998. 
2 The Nevada Legislative Council and Attorney General have ruled that Nevada's term limits cannot be applied to 
those legislators elected in the same year term limits were passed. They first apply to persons elected in 1998. 
 
State  Year 
Enacted 
House Year of 
Impact 
Senate Year of 
Impact 
MAINE  1993 1996 1996 
CALIFORNIA  1990 1996 1998 
COLORADO  1990 1998 1998 
ARKANSAS  1992 1998 2000 
MICHIGAN  1992 1998 2002 
FLORIDA  1992 2000 2000 
OHIO  1992 2000 2000 
SOUTH 1992 2000 2000 
MONTANA  1992 2000 2000 
ARIZONA  1992 2000 2000 
MISSOURI1  1992 2002 2002 
OKLAHOMA  1990 2004 2004 
NEBRASKA 2000 n/a 2006 
LOUISIANA  1995 2007 2007 
NEVADA2  1996 2010 2010 
Table 1: States with Legislative Term Limits by Years of Enactment and Impact  
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
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The details of each initiative vary across states, and there are two different 
categories of term limits, in state legislatures; very lenient or very strict. The first is 
consecutive term limits, which mean that a legislator is limited to serving a certain 
number of years in a chamber and after a set period of time the legislator can run for 
election to the same office and serve up to the limit again (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 2008).  The second is lifetime term limits, which means that once a legislator 
has served up to the limit for that particular office he or she is banned from ever running 
for that office again (National Conference of State Legislatures 2008).  Consecutive term 
limits can be less restrictive because it is possible to rerun for the office in the future.  
Lifetime term limits are obviously the most restrictive because after a legislator is termed 
out of office he or she cannot run for that office in the future. However, he or she can run 
for a higher or lower office.  
The states also vary in the number of years that legislators are allowed to be in 
office.  The most common limit is eight years, but limits include the more strict six-year 
limit and the less strict twelve-year limit (Bowser, Chi, and Little 2006, 19).  Several 
states have more strict term limits for their House of Representatives than they do for 
their Senate (National Conference of State Legislatures 2008).  Nebraska and Oklahoma 
have a total number of years that a legislator can serve in the legislature (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2008).  However, unlike Nebraska’s consecutive term 
limits, an Oklahoma legislator can only serve for a total of twelve years and after twelve 
years he or she is banned from running for the state legislature again for life (National 
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Conference of State Legislatures 2008).  Subsequently, the most strict term limits would 
be those of six years with a lifetime ban and the most lenient would be those of twelve 
years and consecutive term limits.  The following is a breakdown of term limited states, 
which shows the variation in term limit initiatives: 
 
 
Limit in Years Consecutive Lifetime Ban 
6 House / 8 Senate 
 
Arkansas, California, 
Michigan 
8 total Nebraska 
 
8 House / 8 Senate 
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, 
Maine, Montana, Ohio, South 
Dakota 
Missouri 
12 total Oklahoma 
12 House / 12 Senate Louisiana Nevada 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
 
Many of the states have similar restrictions on their legislatures, but with very 
different consequences. The following sections will discuss the current theories on the 
effects of term limits and the different consequences they have had on states.  Some 
arguments state that interest groups have more influence now that term limits have come 
Table 2: Variations in Term Limits by Years and Type 
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into effect, but have done little to prove their statements (Daggett 2005; Tabarrok 1994).  
I will explain the current theories on interest groups and how one can define lobbying 
activities.  I also examine whether or not lobbyists have an influence on government, 
specifically state legislatures.   
Literature Review 
 The focus of term limits has been on professionalism and how term limits have 
encouraged or diminished professional legislatures. There has been very little written on 
the impact that term limits have had on lobbyists’ influence.  Political scientists have yet 
to agree on how lobbyists influence government officials and have yet to agree on how to 
measure interest group influence, as an analysis of the literature will show.  
The following is a review of the current literature on term limits, interest groups 
and lobbyists.  I begin with term limits and include publications from former state 
legislators.  I then analyze articles and books published about interest groups and 
lobbying. I use all of this to determine my measurements for my analysis.   
Term Limits Literature 
The majority of studies written on term limits were written before term limits 
impacted the state legislatures.  Some of it was even written when term limits were first 
enacted by the earliest states.  Several articles explain why the public supports term limits 
and many try to predict what the possible effects will be on the legislatures. Only a few 
try to explain some of the effects of term limits.  This is problematic, especially from a 
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policy evaluation point of view, because several states have term limits and do not know 
what impact they have had on the legislature.  
In the 2005 winter edition of Spectrum: The Journal of State Government, there 
are several short articles on the effects of term limits in different states and overall.  All 
of these articles, excluding that by Gary Moncrief, were written by former members of 
state governments.  Gary Moncrief (2005) examined turnover in state legislatures due to 
term limits.  Term limits have increased legislative turnover, however, it does depend 
upon the state (Moncrief 2005, 26).  For those states that have a strict six-year term limit 
the turnover rate is going to be much higher than in those states with a twelve-year term 
limit (Moncrief 2005, 26).  After term limits impacted state legislatures, the turnover rate 
increased dramatically and continues to increase (Moncrief 2005, 27).  
Effects ultimately depend on the state and if the state’s legislature has a history of 
high turnover. When it is high, term limits do not have a dramatic effect on turnover rates 
and any effect will only be minimal (Moncrief 2005, 27).   Term limits have a significant 
impact on legislative turnover, but how turnover has affected the other branches of 
government is not acknowledged (Moncrief 2005, 27). They have given more power to 
the executive branch, at least in the case of the government of Maine (Daggett 2005, 37).  
This change is due to the fact that the turnover rate is much higher than it used to be, less 
experienced legislators control the legislature, and there is less cooperation (Daggett 
2005, 37).  This has actually given more power to the executive branch and the lobbyists 
(Daggett 2005, 37).   
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Bureaucrats have also benefited from the redistribution of power in Michigan 
(Birkholz 2005, 35).  After term limits were implemented, the governor’s office gained 
more power and the staff grew larger than that of the legislature (Birkholz 2005, 35). This 
was a result of most of the senior legislators being removed from office, which created an 
inexperienced and unknowledgeable legislature (Birkholz 2005, 35).  Power also shifted 
to the bureaucracy because bureaucrats became the policy experts (Birkholz 2005, 35).  
Term limits have encouraged the legislature to be less productive and the 
legislators to be inexperienced (Flake 2005, Bennett 2005). This made lobbyists far more 
important; they are a source of information not only to legislators but also to agencies 
because of the change in the legislature’s composition (Daggett 2005, 37). Limited 
legislators, in Arizona, have had to turn to non-elected actors for information and 
assistance when deciding on complex policies (Flake 2005, 3).  Legislators used to 
become experts in certain fields of policy, and legislators would look to each other for 
guidance; now, staff, lobbyists, and agencies have replaced the communication between 
legislators (Flake 2005, 31; Bennett 2005, 33).  Term limits have also led to poor quality 
legislation being introduced and often passed (Flake 2005). 
As some senators suggested, term limits have increased the power of lobbyists 
because term limited legislators rely more heavily on them for information and guidance 
(Flake 2005; Bennett 2005).  On the other hand, most freshman legislators are more 
concerned with constituent issues and do not become entrenched in special interests 
(Rockefeller 2005, 34). Freshman legislators also spend their free time studying 
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legislation instead of attending social events sponsored by lobbyists (Rockefeller 2005, 
34).  Exceptionally little has been written, specifically, on the impact that term limits 
have on interest groups, but Nelson W. Polsby (2003) argued that term limits can actually 
strengthen lobbyists. Some of the senators’ arguments strengthened Polsby’s statement 
and some contradicted it, but term limits have different results for different states 
(Moncrief 2005).  
The National Conference of State Legislatures put together a study on term limits, 
and as part of the study interest groups and lobbying were included (Kurtz, Cain, and 
Niemi 2007, 119). There are more lobbyists under term limits and they are working much 
harder (Kurtz, Cain and Niemi 2007, 120). The behavior of interest groups has changed 
and interest groups in California, Colorado, and Maine state that more of their time has 
been devoted to giving information and providing resources to legislators (Farmer, 
Rausch Jr., Green 2003, 222). New, inexperienced legislators need the knowledge, 
resources, and information that lobbyists have, but most are distrustful of lobbyists 
(Kurtz, Cain and Niemi 2007, 120). While relationships may be built to ensure a future 
job for the senior legislators, the freshman legislators have to use interest groups to 
acquire more information because they are inexperienced. Both have to increase their 
campaign resources to run for higher office (Pomper and Weiner 2003, 122).   
No change in the power of state interest groups was seen, however, and legislators 
did not seem to access interest groups differently after term limits (Kurtz, Cain and Niemi 
2007, 121). On the other hand, testimony from legislators showed that lobbyists were 
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relied more heavily on after term limits (Kurtz, Cain and Niemi 2007, 122). One 
legislator said that over ninety percent of the legislation was drafted or given to them by a 
lobbyist (Kurtz, Caine and Niemi 2007, 122). Interest groups have also become more 
involved in elections to secure relationships faster (Farmer, Rausch Jr., and Green 2003, 
214). Approximately fifteen percent of those newly elected in 1998 and 2000 said that an 
interest group had asked them to run and only 7.4 percent elected in 1992 or before had 
been asked (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2004, 57). 
Thus, term limits have clearly changed the behavior of interest groups (Sarbaugh-
Thompson et al. 2004, 57). After term limits were implemented there were significant 
increases in the amount of money contributed during the year after the election 
(Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2004, 57). The legislators began to rely more heavily on 
interest groups for guidance and they also relied on them for funding the campaign 
(Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2004, 63). Term limits have strengthened interest groups and 
have increased the number of lobbyists and groups (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2004, 63).  
In 1995, Karp (1995, 373) used survey data from the 1992 American National 
Election Study and other surveys to explain public support for term limits. There are four 
explanations for the support of term limits: “dissatisfaction with legislative performance, 
cynicism, self-interest, and ideological predispositions” (Karp 1995, 373).  Similarly, in 
2002, Stein, Johnson, and Post (2002, 460-462) examined public support for term limits 
and also used cynicism, self-interest, and ideology; however, they did include other 
variables. They included underrepresentation, Republican partisanship, individual versus 
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institutional representation, and attentiveness as their theories about support for term 
limits (Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002, 460).   
Alexander Tabarrok (1994) examined the support for term limits and their effect 
on incumbency, interest groups, the executive, and the bureaucracy. Incumbent 
legislators become unresponsive to the demands of their constituents and avoid their 
responsibilities (Tabarrok 1994, 1).  Also, term limits remove professional politicians 
from the legislature and bring the citizen legislator back to government (Tabarrok 1994, 
2).  On the other hand, term limits make legislators more responsive to public demands 
because they will not be accustomed to pork-barrel spending (Tabarrok 1994, 3). 
However, it is also argued that there will be many more freshman legislators more willing 
to ignore lobbyists (Rockefeller 2005; Tabarrok 1994). All of the authors try to make 
sense of why citizens pushed for term limits (Tabarrok 1994, 3).  
Conventional wisdom would suggest that support for term limits on Congress and 
state legislators is because of dissatisfaction with the legislative body (Karp 1995, 374). 
Term limit initiatives were enacted during a time when approval ratings for states were at 
their lowest and approval ratings for Congress were in the 15 to 20 percent range (Karp 
1995, 374).  Citizens were similarly dissatisfied with state legislatures (Karp 1995, 374). 
Professional legislatures had the highest levels of dissatisfaction because they more 
closely resemble Congress (Karp 1995, 375).  Approval ratings of individual legislators 
were dropping, which is interesting considering legislators are usually able to distance 
themselves from the institution (Karp 1995, 375).    
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 People became dissatisfied with the political process and cynical towards the 
ability of the government to solve problems (Karp 1995, 375).  Cynicism was used to 
explain support of term limits because other studies (Karp 1995) have shown that it is the 
most important factor when determining support for term limits (Stein, Johnson, and Post 
2002). In the 1980s only one in four Americans said that they trusted the government to 
do what was right, and survey data from the 1992 Center for Political Studies National 
Election Study showed a rapid decline in political trust (Karp 1995, 375).  Term limits 
are thought of as a way for the citizens to express their discontent towards government 
and try to change it (Karp 1995, 376).  
The last two theories, selfishness and underrepresentation, are less obvious and 
very difficult to evaluate (Karp 1995, 378; Stein, Johnson, Post 2002, 461). Term limits 
were passed as a selfish act of the citizens and even the political elites (Karp 1995, 378).  
Term limits destroy the incumbency effect and create more opportunity for minorities to 
become policymakers (Karp 1995, 377).  During the term limit debate many issues were 
brought to the forefront (Karp 1995, 377).  When citizens would hear about the different 
changes that term limits would have on the legislature they would vote according to what 
might benefit them the most (Karp 1995, 377). Underrepresentation is similar to the 
variable of self-interest and was used in the same way, to determine partisan effects 
(Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002, 461). Underrepresented groups support term limits 
because term limits increase their likelihood of being elected to public office (Stein, 
Johnson, and Post 461).  
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The last explanation for term limit support was ideology, and it was based on the 
hypothesized effects of term limits (Karp 1995, 378). Conservatives support term limits 
because they theoretically weaken government, decrease wasteful spending, and 
legislators will be less likely to push for pork legislation under them (Karp 1995, 378). 
Republican partisanship, which is similar to ideology, increases the likelihood that 
someone will support term limits because Republicans believe term limits will limit 
wasteful spending, which is part of their party platform (Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002, 
461).   
After examining ideology other variables were introduced (Stein, Johnson, and 
Post 2002). Included in the study was the difference between individual partisanship and 
the party of the entire legislature (Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002, 463). Individual versus 
institutional representation looks at the difference between individual members of the 
legislature and that of the entire legislature (Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002, 463). This is 
very important because most individual legislators have higher approval ratings than the 
institution does and yet term limits were enacted on individual legislators (Stein, Johnson, 
and Post 2002, 463).  Finally, attentiveness was added because the more attentive people 
were to politics the more likely they were to know whether or not their legislators were 
representing their wishes (Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002, 463).                      
The four explanations, cynicism, self-interest, dissatisfaction, and ideology, alone 
or together do not account for all of the support that term limits have received (Karp 
1995, 385).  Poor performance does not have an influence on term limit support but 
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cynicism has the strongest and most consistent effect (Karp 1995, 385).  Still, cynicism is 
not significant enough to explain all of the support for term limits. Ideology has very little 
to do with that support (Karp 1995, 387). Individual support for term limits is related to 
partisan identification and attentiveness to politics (Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002, 472).  
Politically aware citizens who are represented by legislators of a different party are more 
likely to support term limits (Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002, 472).  They also find that 
Karp (1995) was correct because cynicism is moderately significant (Stein, Johnson, and 
Post 2002, 472). However, more needs to be written on the topic because the focus has 
been on national legislative term limits and not state term limits (Stein, Johnson, and Post 
2002, 460). 
 Gary F. Moncrief, Joel A. Thompson, Michael Haddon, and Robert Hoyer (1992) 
examined the effects that term limits have had on the stability of state legislatures, as did 
Cynthia Opheim (1994) and Wayne L. Francis and Lawrence W. Kenny (1997).  
Moncrief et al. (1992) wanted to determine how many freshman legislators, serving 
during the 1979-80 session, would be affected by term limits. Observed are the effects of 
twelve-year term limits on state legislature turnover rates, because most of the initiatives 
called for a twelve-year limit (Moncrief et al. 1992, 39).  Several things were assumed 
because term limits in most states had not yet been enacted.  First, the time served in one 
house would not count against time served in the other house and second, term limits 
only apply if the years are served consecutively (Moncrief et al. 1992, 39). This means 
that a legislator could serve twelve years in the House of Representatives and twelve 
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years in the Senate. Also, that a legislator could serve, for example, six years in the 
Senate, sit out for a few years, and then return with the full twelve years available.  
 The result was that term limits would have very little effect on professionalization 
because most state legislators did not retain their office for longer than twelve years; six-
year term limits had a more severe effect (Moncrief et al. 1992, 42). Over half of the 
legislators were predicted to be termed out of the state legislatures by the eight-year term 
limit (Opheim 1994, 55).   Retention rate for those legislators in professional legislatures 
was much higher than those in citizen legislatures, and 37.5 percent of professional 
legislatures have had term limits imposed on them (Opheim 1994, 55, 57).  
The same assumptions that Moncrief et al. (1992, 39) employed are also used by 
Opheim (1994, 51). The time served in one house does not count against time served in 
another house and the term limits only apply to years in office served consecutively 
(Opheim 1994, 51). These assumptions were applied to discover how many state 
legislators, who were serving in 1994, would be affected by a term limitation (Opheim 
1994, 51).  Data from thirty-five states that did not have term limits and fifteen states that 
had adopted term limits were used (Opheim 1994, 51). Retention rates in the House of 
Representatives in professional legislatures were much higher than those in hybrid or 
citizen legislatures (Opheim 1994, 57). However, retention rates in all term limited states 
were lower than retention rates in non-term limited states (Opheim 1994, 56). This is 
consistent with previous arguments on the same topic and only reinforces the argument 
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that term limits have had an effect on the structure and professionalism of state 
legislatures.           
Thus, in the more professional legislatures, seniority will be decreased and there 
will be more open seats, but in citizen legislatures it will be unlikely to decrease seniority 
because most legislators do not stay for twelve years (Moncrief et al. 1992, 44; Opheim 
1994, 56).  Term limits will not only create higher turnover rates because people are 
being removed from office, they will also generate more legislators running for higher 
office (Francis and Kenny 1997 248). Consequently, there will be even greater turnover 
rates than would have been expected (Francis and Kenny 1997, 248).  Finally, the high 
turnover rates will create an inexperienced legislature (Francis and Kenny 1997, 251).   
 Similarly, Francis and Kenny (1997, 251) examined the effects of the six-year 
term limits, but they also examined eight-year term limits instead of twelve. The 1979-80 
sessions were used to determine the effects of term limits on the exit rates of state 
legislators (Francis and Kenny 1997, 241).  Included were the effects that senate turnover 
rates have had on house turnover rates (Francis and Kenny 1997, 241). Before term 
limits, state and national legislators chose reelection over seeking higher office and 
retiring from elected office 75 to 80 percent of the time (Francis and Kenny 1997, 241). 
This was because the chance of winning a race for higher office was unlikely, especially 
if there was an incumbent. With term limits there are more open seats, so the number of 
legislators running for higher office will increase (Francis and Kenny 1997, 241).   
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 The turnover rate for state House of Representative’s members was from 26 to 28 
percent in 1979-80 and twenty-two percent in 1985-86 and the average turnover rate from 
1982-92 was over 23.5 percent (Francis and Kenny 1997, 242). Consequently, after term 
limits, one-third to three-fifths of the legislators will be new members under eight-year 
term limits and an even greater number of new members will fill legislatures under six-
year term limits (Francis and Kenny 1997, 251). This will create inexperienced 
legislatures and, in those states with more professional legislatures, the members will 
continue to seek higher office to maintain their political careers (Francis and Kenny 1997, 
251). As a result, most of the legislatures will become full of inexperienced members 
(Francis and Kenny 1997, 251). In all states the turnover rates will increase, reaching 
approximately 45 percent (Francis and Kenny 1997, 251). This came to a similar 
conclusion as other studies (Moncrief et al. 1992); however, if the study is correct than 
turnover rates and professionalism in most states will not be affected because they have 
twelve-year limits (Francis and Kenny 1997, 251). 
Related to the turnover rate is the fact that the legislators know they will be termed 
out soon and elect to retire from office before their term is over, therefore, creating  more 
special elections (Caress 1996, 673).  This has also led to a change in the behavior of 
legislators and the composition of the institution (Caress 1996, 673). This, in turn, has 
created an increase in special elections, specifically in California because incumbents do 
not always wait until election year to vacate their seat (Caress 1996, 673). In California, 
most of the special elections since 1990, the year term limits were enacted, have been 
20 
 
 
 
because an incumbent pursued other career options (Caress 1996, 673).  Every year there 
is an average of ten special elections. In 1993 there were 16, which is the highest it has 
ever been (Caress 1996, 673).  Special elections are costly and the cost from 1990 to 
1993 in California was thirteen million dollars (Caress 1996, 674). Because of the 
increase in special elections there has consequently been an increase in financial burden 
to the state (Caress 1996, 674).  If special elections continue to occur more often there 
will be more of a financial burden to the public (Caress 1996, 674). This is an aspect of 
turnover and seat vacation that most people do not take into consideration. It is becoming 
increasingly important, especially during times of economic hardship.   
 Term limits also have an impact on legislative behavior. The time legislators have 
to devote to securing pork has decreased and there is a heightened priority placed on the 
needs of the state and on the demands of the constituents (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 
1998, 271).  Three categories of hypotheses are used to explain the effects of term limits 
on the legislature and its members: compositional, behavioral, and institutional (Carey, 
Niemi and Powell 1998, 271). After examining all three areas, the demographics of the 
legislatures with term limits are the same as before term limits were enacted (Carey, 
Niemi, and Powell 1998, 295).  Term limits also decreased the amount of time legislators 
spent on securing pork for their districts, and they placed more attention on the needs of 
the state and their constituents (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 295). Term limits have 
also affected whether or not legislators will run for reelection (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 
1998, 295). Before term limits over ninety percent of legislators ran for reelection; 
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however, since term limits there has been an increase in the number of incumbents 
retiring, even though they are permitted to run for reelection (Caress 1996, 672).   
 A survey of legislators was used to determine if term limits are associated with 
fewer career politicians and with a more diverse legislature, in terms of age, occupation, 
gender, religion, ethnicity, income, and other demographic characteristics (Carey, Niemi, 
and Powell 1998, 274). Also examined was whether or not “greater conservatism or 
ideological extremism” is the source of term limits (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 
274).  Term limits should make legislative service less appealing to those seeking a 
career in politics (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 274). Proponents believe that this will 
create more open seats, and therefore, attract individuals not aspiring to become career 
politicians (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 274). Furthermore, it should diversify the 
legislature because more women and minorities will be able to win a legislative seat 
(Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 274).   
The behavior of term limited legislators was examined and the focus was on 
whether legislators thought of politics as a career, whether or not they intended to run for 
reelection, whether or not they desired to seek higher office, and if they held a job outside 
of the legislature (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 275-276). The behavior of legislators 
has changed because more legislators are retiring and doing so midterm (Caress 1996, 
674). Term limits affected the composition of the state legislature and have impacted 
agenda setting and consensus building in the California legislature (Caress 1996, 672). To 
measure the legislator’s behavior, questions about their career aspirations were included 
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in a survey (Carey, Niemi and, Powell 1998, 275). Term limit advocates have stated that 
term limits will limit the time legislators devote to securing votes and increase the 
amount of time for legislative duties (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 275).  Taking that 
into consideration, legislators should spend less time campaigning, fund-raising, meeting 
with constituents and providing services to them, and spend more time developing 
legislation and creating legislative coalitions (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 275).   
Because term limits have an effect on career aspirations, focus was given to the 
behavioral hypothesis of how the legislators conduct their campaigns. Specifically, 
whether or not they hire campaign managers and establish campaign headquarters (Carey, 
Niemi, and Powell 1998, 275). This may discourage legislators from running for 
reelection because of the increased cost. Many legislators have decided that reelection 
has too many costs associated with it (Caress 1996, 672).  After term limits were enacted 
the number of incumbents not seeking reelection was about 20 percent higher than before 
(Caress 1996, 672). Only 70 percent of incumbents sought reelection after term limits 
were enacted (Caress 1996, 672). This, however, may not hold true in other states and it 
may not hold true in later years (Caress 1996, 673). This decrease in incumbents could 
have been created by other factors, especially taking into considering that, in 1992, 
reapportionment happened and historically incumbents leave if their seats become 
competitive (Caress 1996, 672).   
Cary, Niemi, and Powell (1998, 276) also examined previous arguments made 
about the institutional effects that term limits may or may not have had.  Term limits 
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increase the power of the party and the power of the governors (Carey, Niemi, and 
Powell 1998, 276).  Term limits decrease the power of interest groups because legislators 
do not require campaign contributions from groups. Some legislators become more 
reliant on interest groups for jobs after they are termed out (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 
1998, 276).  Likewise, the biggest effect term limits have is on the bureaucracy and 
executive branch (Tabarrok 1994, 5).  Unlike Tabarrok (1994), Carey, Niemi and Powell 
(1998, 277) created a survey to determine the institutional effect.  Legislators were asked 
about the influence of certain actors within the legislature and whether they perceived 
their powers to be increasing, decreasing, or remaining the same (Carey, Niemi, and 
Powell 1998, 277). The same questions were asked about actors outside of the legislature 
and finally, using the legislator’s tenure and nature of term limits in their state, the 
partisan effects of term limits were estimated (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 277). The 
results showed that there was not a dramatic change in the composition of state 
legislatures and the only difference between non-term limited states and term limited 
states was the number of women elected to office (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 280-
281).  
There are more women elected to term limited states; however, this cannot 
necessarily be contributed to term limits (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 281). It may 
have to do with the ideology of the state. There is also no difference in term limited and 
non-term limited states in the number of extreme conservatives and extreme liberals 
(Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 281). Term limits have undermined responsiveness to 
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constituents; however, term limited legislators are not less likely to seek politics as a 
career (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 290).  Finally, the power of governors has 
increased while the power of party leaders has decreased (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 
1998, 296).  The same results have been consistently found; however, nothing more has 
been done than theorize because term limits have only been enacted for eight years in 
some states and impacted for fewer in other states. Term limits have changed institutional 
behavior and have increased the power of the bureaucracy because they have reduced the 
tenure of committee chairs (Tabarrok 1994, 5). This is of concern because fewer senior 
legislators create an inexperienced legislature, less knowledge on specific issues, and 
more reliance on staff and agencies (Tabarrok 1994, 5).  The reduced tenure in office also 
creates fewer relationships between the legislature and the bureaucracy to be made and 
thus, the executive branch becomes more powerful (Tabarrok 1994, 5).  
One of the main reasons people examined the possible effects on tenure was 
because the longer a legislator was in office the more relationships with interest groups 
that legislator has (Tabarrok 1994, 4). Term limits reduce relationship building because 
new legislators are automatically put in office and senior legislators are termed out of 
office (Tabarrok 1994, 4).  If the legislature is not really representing the public, then we 
should “throw the bums out”. The incumbency rate is so high that the public put in an 
institutional mechanism that will “throw the bums out” routinely (Tabarrok 1994, 4).  
 Proponents of term limits argued that they will reduce interest group influence 
(Tabarrok 1994, 3). However, term limits can also increase the cost of bargaining and 
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making promises (Tabarrok 1994, 3).  One reason for this is that term limits reduce the 
amount of time available to create relationships and the need to cooperate with others, 
considering there is an end in the future (Tabarrok 1994, 4).  However, this may make 
interest groups lobby the parties instead of individual representatives (Tabarrok 1994, 4).  
Legislators may pass more legislation that will benefit their careers after being termed out 
of office (Tabarrok 1994, 4).  In the end, the effects on interest groups will be minimal 
and if there is any effect it will be a change in whom they lobby (Tabarrok 1994, 5).   
The behavior of legislators has changed dramatically and not in the way that the 
public hoped for (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, Caress 1996 and Tabarrok 1994). 
When term limits were passed many voters did not think of the negative consequences. 
Instead, part of the appeal of term limits was the fact that they would stop wasteful 
spending and reduce the size of government (Erier 2007, 479). Term limits should 
decrease state spending levels because the legislators are not in office long enough to 
make relationships and secure pork for their constituents or special interests (Erier 2007, 
479). Abbie Erier (2007) used the fiscal data from 48 states from 1977 to 2001 and 
compared those states with term limits to those states without term limits. Term limited 
states actually have higher levels of spending than those without (Erier 2007, 479).       
To test the hypothesis, general spending was examined, which included spending 
on education, highways, welfare, and interest on debt (Erier 2007, 482).  States with term 
limits have seen a much greater increase in their expenditures than non-term limited 
states (Erier 2007, 482). The growth rate of expenditures in term limited states has risen 
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from 1.8 percent, before term limits, to 2.8 percent, after term limits (Erier 2007, 482).  
Expenditures in states without term limits have remained constant or only increased by 
less than half a percentage (Erier 2007, 482).  Interestingly enough, spending in term 
limited states on education has not changed (Erier 2007, 482). However, spending on 
welfare, health, and highways and transportation has done so substantially (Erier 2007, 
486).  States with term limits spend 29 percent more on welfare and over 14 percent more 
on transportation than states without term limits (Erier 2007, 486). The largest adjustment 
in spending has been in health and health expenditures. In term limited states those 
expenditures are 31.5 percent higher than in non-term limited states (Erier 2007, 486).  
Not only do term limited states have higher spending but the amount continues to go up 
(Erier 2007, 480).  Even though the numbers show that spending has risen in those states 
with term limits the reason is still unclear, but this article does show that the intended 
outcomes have not been produced (Erier 2007, 491).  It is very clear that instead of 
cutting spending, spending has increased.  There have been several unintended 
consequences and there may be others that come to light in the future.  
Using the information above, I try to determine if term limits have actually 
increased the power of lobbyists, as the former government officials suggested.  
However, before I can do that I must determine what is meant by lobbyist influence and 
what the literature says about the topic. The writings on term limits are focused on a few 
areas, most of it was done before term limits impacted states, and none of it evaluates the 
effects across the entire nation. Similarly, examination of interest groups is limited in its 
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scope because very little has been done to determine a statistically significant measure of 
influence. The next section discusses what has been written on interest groups and 
examines the different theories on interest groups.  
Lobbyist Influence Literature 
 Interest groups have been examined for many years and political scientists have 
yet to come up with a simple and consistent way of measuring influence. Keith Hamm 
(1983) wrote about patterns of influence. Even though it is an older article the 
information provided is still applicable today.  Even with the ethic reforms and the 
increase in regulatory committees, interest groups continue to behave in the ways 
described by Hamm (1983).  He points to Morris Ogul’s (1981) argument that when an 
interest group is trying to influence the decisions of a committee the interest group gives 
publicity to certain legislators in periodicals, invites legislators to speak at organization 
meetings, gives campaign contributions, provides legislators with tickets to dinners or 
theatrical shows, provides transportation, and other activities (Hamm 1983, 394). An 
interest group also testifies before Congress, holds breakfasts for Congressmen, and has 
its members contact their Representatives (Hamm 1983, 394-395).  These actions have 
actually made members of Congress remove themselves from those committees that the 
interest groups did not want them on (Hamm 1983). They then joined the committees that 
the interest groups did want them to be members of (Hamm 1983, 395). Likewise, David 
Nice (1984) wrote on the impact interest groups have on the policymaking process in 
states.  Interest groups communicate to the public issues that the parties will not address 
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and, of course, perform the usual functions of providing research and information, drafts 
for speeches, and “strokes to the ego” (Nice 1984, 184). 
 Hamm (1983, 382) discussed how interest groups actually do these types of 
activities and first examined recruitment for committee positions and how exactly an 
interest group would be able to recruit legislators to certain committees. Buchanan 
(1963), who studied the California legislature, was added to explain interest group 
activities (Hamm 1983, 382).  Interest groups provide campaign funds and endorsements 
during election years to gain the legislators’ trust and support (Hamm 1983, 383).  
Looking at Buchanan (1963), Hamm (1983, 383) states, “The lobby would recommend 
supporters for powerful and strategic committee assignments, the supporters would 
request assignments strategic to the lobby, and the speaker would act upon the 
suggestions and requests.”  This is extremely important when considering the influence 
that interest groups have on state legislatures and their members. When this article was 
published the states had not been term limited yet, and therefore, interest groups had not 
been affected.  However, using this information, especially the impact that campaign 
funds have, I can determine if there has been an increase in interest group influence since 
term limits were enacted. 
Anthony Nownes and Patricia Freeman (1998) also tried to determine what 
techniques were used by groups in states, how much groups do, if the techniques differ 
across groups, and what types of groups were most active in states. State groups are more 
active and influential than those in Washington (Nownes and Freeman 1998, 88).  
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Several different categories were used to define lobbyist advocacy activities, including 
testifying at legislative hearings, contacting government officials, drafting legislation, 
informing legislators of a bill’s effects, and having constituents contact legislators 
(Nownes and Freeman 1998, 88).   Electoral activities, endorsing candidates, working on 
campaigns, and making campaign contributions were also included (Nownes and 
Freeman 1998, 91). Twenty-three different techniques were examined and the lobbyists 
and organizations used most of them, anywhere from 13 to all 23 (Nownes and Freeman 
1998, 93).   
The atmosphere of state politics allows lobbyists to flourish because citizens are 
not as salient on state issues and lawmakers are able to look to interest groups for help 
without being punished by his or her constituents (Nice 1984, 184).  State legislators rely 
on lobbyists because their staff is very small and when lawmakers are new to the 
legislature they rely even more heavily on lobbyists to make their transition easier (Nice 
1984, 184).  If this is true then term limited states should have even more lobbyist 
influence because there are fewer senior legislators. New legislators rely more on 
lobbyists and term limited states always have a large supply of new legislators (Nice 
1984, 184). Lobbyists who provide information, ideas for legislation, campaign 
assistance, and build the legislators’ reputation usually get repaid in some way (Nice 
1984, 184). To assess the influence of interest groups a large compilation of articles was 
used to determine how others have measured the power of lobbyists (Potters and Sloof 
1996, 407).   
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After reviewing the definitions of interest group activities, four tactics were agreed 
upon (Potters and Sloof 1996, 407). Those tactics are what lobbyists use to persuade 
government officials (Potters and Sloof 1996, 407).  Interest groups pressure and 
mobilize the citizens, give campaign contributions, lobby congress and the executive 
branch, and go to court (Potters and Sloof 1996, 407).  Lobbyists and organizations say 
their most common activities are testifying at legislative hearings and contacting 
government officials directly (Nownes and Freeman 1998, 91).  Other techniques that are 
universally used by lobbyists and interest groups are helping draft legislation, informing 
state legislators about a bill’s effects, and having influential constituents contact 
legislators (Nownes and Freeman 1998).  Eighty percent of the groups and lobbyists also 
state that activities like grass-roots lobbying, shaping policy implementation, drafting 
legislation and rules, raising new issues, talking to the media and several other informal 
activities are employed (Nownes and Freeman 1998). The electoral activities that the 
majority of the lobbyists and groups engage in are endorsing candidates, working on 
campaigns, and, similar to all of the other arguments, giving campaign contributions 
(Nownes and Freeman 1998).   
The arguments are mixed as to whether or not campaign contributions actually 
affect how a legislator is going to vote and whether or not money influences government 
decision making (Potters and Sloof 1996, 408). Campaign contributions are thought of as 
investments to obtain a favorable outcome and in the legislature they are used to obtain a 
favorable policy (Potters and Sloof 1996, 408). The information on campaign 
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contributions and how they actually affect a legislator’s vote on policy is mixed (Potters 
and Sloof 1996).  In some cases contributions have shown to have significant influence 
on voting behavior, while other times the influence of contributions is only moderate, 
however, it still exists (Potters and Sloof 1996).  Even still, it may not have any influence 
over a legislators’ voting behavior (Potters and Sloof 1996).  
 Total campaign contributions by organized labor had a significant impact on a 
legislator’s voting behavior when it came to minimum wage issues (Potters and Sloof 
1996).  Nevertheless, there were shortcomings with this analysis because it only 
examined one interest group and it did not take into consideration the legislator’s party 
affiliation. However, five political action committees of national associations were 
examined and the PACs were unable to change the voting outcome (Potters and Sloof 
1996, 409).  The other studies examined came up with mixed results when it came to 
committee voting as well.  There is sometimes little to no influence on the voting 
behavior of legislators in committee and at other times there has been significant 
influence (Potters and Sloof 1996).   
 When it comes to lobbying, political scientists have yet to come up with a perfect 
definition but studies have shown that lobbying does have a significant influence on 
policy (Potters and Sloof 1996, 413).  However, when examining voting on five bills, 
which two lobbyist groups endorsed a specific policy position, evidence was found that 
lobbyists were able to influence the legislators (Potters and Sloof 1996, 413).  State per 
capita membership was used to measure the strength of the interest group and showed 
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that the lobbyists were successful in influencing the votes of representatives (Potters and 
Sloof 1996, 413).  Interest group testimony has a profound effect on how legislators 
voted for U.S. Supreme Court nominations (Potters and Sloof 1996, 413-414). Lobbying 
expenditures also had a significant impact on policy, specifically the National Education 
Association’s impact on teaching salaries (Potters and Sloof 1996, 414).  The number of 
auto club lobbyists per capita had an effect on the number of required vehicle inspections 
and the number of registered lobbyists in an urban center reduced the number of days the 
center was in violation of emissions standards (Potters and Sloof 1996, 414).   
Campaign contributions and lobbying alter a legislator’s voting behavior, 
especially when bills have a narrow focus and low public visibility (Potters and Sloof 
1996, 414). The strategy of interest groups is oriented towards supporting like-minded 
legislators (Potters and Sloof 1996, 414).  When an interest group has a large number of 
members it is able to influence more legislators (Potters and Sloof 1996, 414). A group’s 
stake in influencing public policy is a positive determinant of both its political activity 
and its success (Potters and Sloof 1996, 414).  The relation between the number of 
potential participants of collective action and influence on policy outcomes is driven by 
both free-riding effects and effects on the group’s resources (Potters and Sloof 1996, 
414). The same holds true for measures of concentration (Potters and Sloof 1996, 414). 
The presence of an opposition or coalition force in the political arena hurts or helps a 
group’s clout (Potters and Sloof 1996, 414).  Strong electoral pressures on the public and 
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the presence of a well-informed electorate seem to lower the influence of interest groups 
(Potters and Sloof 1996, 414). 
When groups and lobbyists were asked where they were most active and which 
branch of government is most important to them, 90 percent of groups and 95 percent of 
lobbyists say that the legislature is a very important target of their activity (Nownes and 
Freeman 1998, 96).  These groups and lobbyists also spend time within the other 
branches of government and more specifically interact with legislative committees 
(Nownes and Freeman 1998). In California, almost 80 percent of groups and 90 percent 
of lobbyists interact with more than five legislative committees; in South Carolina, 85 
percent of groups and lobbyists interact with three or more committees; and in 
Wisconsin, 80 percent of groups and lobbyists interacted with three or more committees 
(Nownes and Freeman 1998).  All of this is very important when examining interest 
group activities and how lobbyists influence government because it lists what activities 
are engaged in most often and on which branch most of that activity is focused. Thus, this 
shows that most of the efforts from lobbyists are made towards the legislative branch. 
When it comes to the power those interest groups have over legislators, however, 
it is more psychological (Nice 1984, 185).  The strongest influence an individual or group 
could have over an official would result from having the official perceive that his would-
be influencer has the power to keep him in office or remove him from office (Nice 1984, 
185).  Candidates in Wisconsin were three times more likely than state wide officials to 
feel that interest groups were most important in determining electoral success (Nice 
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1984).  State legislative candidates did not feel that political parties and campaign 
volunteers were as important as interest groups (Nice 1984).  States with liberal interest 
group systems have higher Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits and similar 
welfare benefits (Nice 1984, 192-193). States where interest group endorsed candidates 
win elections more money tends to be spent on highways because most of those interest 
groups represented labor and business interests (Nice 1984, 192-193). 
Even though the results are mixed on the degree of influence that lobbyists and 
interest groups have over certain areas and levels of government, there is still an impact 
and they are still very influential.  Most is, however, limited to interest group influence in 
the national government and interest groups in states have a much different atmosphere in 
which to work.  This helps me to determine which variables to use and which to leave 
out.  Lobbyists use campaign contributions to influence legislators and they seem to have 
been very influential. The ways of defining influence are important; yet, for this paper 
some are impractical and immeasurable.  
There are more lobbyists who are working harder and exercise more influence 
because legislators have to rely on lobbyists to provide them with resources and 
information (Kurtz, Cain, and Niemi 2007, 120).  Term limits were proposed and adopted 
to decrease the legislators’ interest in re-election, which would presumably reduce the 
need for campaign contributions from interest groups (Kurtz et al. 2007, 120-121).  
However, this does not seem to be happening.  For an explanation of the impact of term 
limits, one can examine simple variables to measure interest group influence. Term limits 
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have created an increase in lobbyist influence but little quantitative analysis has been 
done on the extent by which interest groups are becoming even more entrenched in state 
legislatures. 
Data and Methodology 
An examination of term limits and all of the various effects they have had on the 
legislature suggests that term limits have created legislatures that are less 
professionalized in a variety of ways.  Term limits have created legislators that are 
inexperienced, lack knowledge, and are more dependent on other sources when first 
entering the legislature (Caress 1996; Francis and Kenny 1997; Moncrief et al. 1992; 
Opheim 1994).  Turnover rates have also increased in those states with term limits, which 
in turn have increased the number of inexperienced legislators (Caress 1996; Francis and 
Kenny 1997; Moncrief et al. 1992; Opheim 1994). This then makes the majority of the 
legislators uninformed as to the workings of the legislature. As a result they then must 
rely on outside sources.  
To assess the effects of term limits on lobbyists’ influence I use a quasi-
experimental design.  Examination of policy effects at the state level rely on cross-
sectional analysis, time series analysis, or a combination of the two approaches.  Using a 
time dimension is helpful because I want to assess the consequences of term limits, which 
have impacted the states at different times. I make use of a combination and perform a 
cross-sectional time series analysis. Two separate regressions, fixed effects model and 
autoregressive model, examine the two dependent variables, lobbyists and contributions, 
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for all 24 states. I apply a fixed effects model to correct for the state-specific bias in 
coefficients.  Errors should be randomly distributed, and using groups can make the 
errors correlated with other errors from a given state or year. Because I am also using 
years I include an auto regressive model, which controls for the year-to-year correlation 
errors.       
To determine if lobbyist activity is higher in those states with term limits, I draw 
on similar variables that were previously used by others.  I use the most readily available 
information I could find from The Center of Public Integrity, The National Institute on 
Money in State Politics, and online government databases. As my dependent variables I 
use the natural log of (1) the number of registered lobbyists in each state for each year, 
and (2) the amount of campaign contributions given to each state each year. Using the log 
transformation allows me to retain cases with extreme values without violating the 
normality assumption. Using these, one can see that interest groups have grown in size 
and interest groups use money and information to influence legislators. 
States are used as the unit of analysis because, even though term limits affect 
legislators, I want to evaluate the impact that term limits have had on the entire state 
legislature as a whole.  I do not use all of the term limited states in my analysis because 
some of them have not been impacted yet or were just very recently impacted.  I use all 
of the term limited states except Nevada, Louisiana, Arizona and Nebraska and I only use 
even years from 1998 to 2008.   
37 
 
 
 
My independent variable of interest is term limits in state legislatures and my 
dependent variable is interest group influence, measured by the number of registered 
lobbyists and campaign contributions.  I use a 1 for term limited states and a 0 for non-
term limited states.  Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, 
Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Dakota are my term limited states because they 
have been impacted by term limits for four years or longer. Louisiana, Nebraska, Arizona 
and Nevada are not used for many reasons.  Louisiana was not impacted by term limits 
until 2007, so there has not been enough time for most legislators to be termed out. 
Nebraska is not used because it was only recently impacted. It was also excluded because 
it has a unitary legislature and is difficult to compare to other states.  I also did not 
include Nevada because it will not be impacted until 2010. Arizona is left out because the 
state is not required to keep year-to-year figures of lobbyists’ activities and its lobbyist 
disclosure laws are not similar to other states. Finally, I did not use Nevada because the 
legislature is only in session on odd years and does not report any lobbyist information at 
any other time.   
I also only use non-term limited states that have complete data for the even years 
going back ten years ago. Eleven term limited states and 13 non-term limited states are 
included. This still gives me sufficient information to evaluate the differences between 
the majority of term limited states and non-term limited states.  The fixed effects models 
include dummy variables for state effects.  I code each state variable with a 1 for its 
corresponding state-year unit and a 0 for all other state-year units (Alabama variable is 
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coded 1 for Alabama 1998, Alabama 2000… Alabama 2008 and coded 0 for Alaska 
1998, Alaska 2000… Wisconsin 2008).  This takes care of the effects that are not 
included in my other control variables and controls for heteroskedasticity, which can 
inflate t-scores and make insignificant variables appear significant.    
The number of registered lobbyists and campaign contributions are the dependent 
variables that measure interest group influence.  The number of registered lobbyists is 
used as the dependent variable to measure the volume of lobbying that happens in each 
state’s legislature. The number of registered lobbyists is used as a measurement because 
it shows how many lobbyists there are communicating with legislators.  When there are 
more lobbyists, interest group resources are more readily available to legislators.  In 
addition, legislators in term limited states are inexperienced and not knowledgeable about 
policy (Francis and Kenny 1997; Moncrief et al. 1992).  In the end, the new legislators 
look to someone for answers and lobbyists are thought of as policy experts.   
When only a few lobbyists exist in a state, some legislators may not come into 
contact with them. The more lobbyists there are the more likely a legislator is to hear 
from multiple sources.  Also, if there are more lobbyists the new, inexperienced 
legislators will have information available. Similarly, when there are more lobbyists for 
each interest, then the issue will become more salient to the legislators and there will be 
more opportunities for the legislators to use lobbyists. Legislators will also build 
relationships with lobbyists to ensure a job when he or she is out of office (Pomper and 
Weiner 2003).  Therefore, the lobbyists will take advantage of this fact and interest 
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groups will hire legislators that have been termed out of office, who might therefore, 
build relationships to gain employment. I hypothesize that the number of registered 
lobbyists will be larger in those states and years with term limits than in states without 
term limits, holding other factors constant.  
The initial way lobbyists try to influence legislators is by giving money to their 
campaigns.  In term limited states lobbyists do not have the leisure of developing long 
term relationships with legislators over time.  The amount of campaign contributions is 
another dependent variable to measure interest group influence.  It is used because I 
compare how much money is going into each state from interest groups to determine if 
those states with term limits are receiving more funds.  All legislators, even term limited 
legislators, must run for office, and money is required to run a winning campaign.  Term 
limits have increased the turnover rate, which in turn, has created more open races 
(Moncrief et al. 1992; Francis and Kenny 1997; Opheim 1994).  This requires interest 
groups to build relationships more quickly by providing campaign funds. If they provide 
funds then the legislators will be more likely to return the favor.  I hypothesize that 
campaign contributions will be higher in term limited states and years because long term 
relationships are not made between lobbyists and legislators.   
The increase in open races is also requiring lobbyists to give more money each 
election year. Term limited states have more open races and lobbyists need to gain access 
to legislators. In term limited states lobbyists have to act quickly, which is why campaign 
contributions are a measurement of influence. Only even years are included because the 
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majority of funds that come from interest groups come during election years and several 
states do not report contributions every year. I include campaign contributions since 1998 
because by then most of the term limited states had been impacted by term limits.  
I control for other factors by including political, social and economic variables. 
My political variables are percent of Republicans in the state legislatures and election 
cycle. After examining the literature on term limits, I found that term limits were 
supported by Republicans and those desiring to minimize spending and reduce interest 
group influence (Karp 1995; Stein, Johnson, and Post 2002). This does not necessarily 
imply which party uses interest groups more; however, it suggests that Republicans may 
find interest groups more objectionable than Democrats (Karp 1995; Stein, Johnson, and 
Post 2002). Therefore, I include several control variables in my regression. I control for 
percentage of Republicans in each state legislature for each year because, as stated above, 
one party may be less tolerant of lobbyists. If that party controls the legislature the 
number of lobbyists in that state may be less than if the party did not control the 
legislature.  I then control for election cycle because contributions will increase or 
decrease depending on the year. During midterm elections there may be more 
contributions going towards state legislators. Interest groups do not have to support 
presidential candidates during midterm elections and regular election years may 
experience lower levels of contributions to states. 
My demographic variables are percent of the population that is Hispanic, percent 
of the population that is black, and percent of the population that is 65 years of age and 
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older in each state for each year. I include the percent of the population that is 65 years of 
age and older because the elderly vote more regularly and may oppose term limits 
because they would reduce incumbency. Therefore, the elderly would vote against term 
limits. States with high populations of elderly should have lower levels of lobbyists and 
campaign contributions under the assumption that incumbency is more likely. However, 
there are multiple interest groups that support senior issues; therefore, higher numbers of 
lobbyists would exist. I use the percent Hispanic and the percent black to control for the 
influence these groups may have on the number of lobbyists and contributions. There are 
also a large number of groups that represent minorities and in states with large 
populations of minorities more groups would exist. States with higher populations of 
minorities should have higher levels of contributions and lobbyists because legislators are 
continually being forced out of office or forced to run for higher office. Also, higher 
proportions of minorities could be associated with higher lobbyist influence because the 
influence of minorities tends to be suppressed where it could threaten the status quo. 
Finally, I include economic variables to control for factors that would change 
lobbyists’ influence, such as the percentage of unemployed and the median income. I 
control for both of these because they could create an increase in the number of lobbyists 
in each state. If a state has a high median income more lobbyists would exist because 
more businesses would exist. Business is the leading interest group in all states and in the 
nation; therefore, more businesses would create more lobbyists (Pomper and Weiner 
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2003). Unemployment can also have an impact on the number of lobbyists because 
business activity decreases during economic down-turns.  
Results 
 I show the results for two separate regressions for each of my dependent variables. 
I ran fixed effects and auto-regressive models. The auto-regressive model uses a common 
autoregressive parameter because other models, such as the generalized least squares 
model, allow for heteroskedasticity errors within the cross-sectional time series analysis 
(Beck and Katz 1995, 634). The fixed effects model includes state dummy variables to 
control for state-specific effects that may bias coefficients. When running the regression I 
found that the number of registered lobbyists and campaign contributions were positively 
skewed because of a few outliers. To reduce the effects of outliers I use the natural log of 
both. This does not change any of the information; however, it does allow the variables to 
be normally distributed. The number of observations for all of the models is 144 (6 years 
times 24 states). The explained variance (Adjusted R2) varies between each model, from 
.603 to .935. I show unstandarized regression coefficients and their significance levels 
(see Table 3). 
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Table 3.  Effects of Term Limits on Lobbyists and Campaign Contributions, 1998—2008 
 Lobbyists Campaign Contributions 
Independent Variables Fixed Effects 
Model 
Auto-regressive 
Model  
Fixed Effects 
Model 
Auto-regressive 
Model 
Term Limits .141** .088** .378** .432** 
Percent Republican .006** .007*  .002 
Midterm Election .051 .004 .165 .218 
Percent Black .153** .035** .062** .073** 
Percent Hispanic .022** .033** .084** .077** 
Percent over 65 .080** .091**  .048* 
Median Income  .005*  .019* 
Unemployment  -.001  .027 
Auto Correlation (rho)  .739  .277 
Constant 4.11** 4.23** 15.49** 13.73** 
Significant state 
dummies 
13  4  
Adjusted R2 .849 .935 .603 .804 
N 144 144 144 144 
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
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The dependent variables are shown across the top row and the regression 
coefficients for each model appear below each dependent variable. Some of the control 
variables reached statistical significance, while others did not. The percent of 
Republicans in state legislatures is significantly associated with the number of registered 
lobbyists when controlling for year-to-year differences, and when controlling for state-
specific effects. It is not significant in either model of campaign contributions. However, 
whether or not the year was a midterm election year is not statistically significant in any 
of the four models, meaning that the timing of midterm elections had no effect on 
lobbyists or campaign contributions. Both percent black and percent Hispanic are 
statistically significant in all four models. Similarly, the percent of the population that is 
over 65 years of age is significant in all models for lobbyists and slightly significant for 
the auto regressive model but it is not significant for the fixed effects model of campaign 
contributions. Median income is not significant in the fixed effects models, so it was 
dropped from those analyses. However, it is significant in the auto regressive models. 
Similarly, unemployment is not significant in the fixed effects models; therefore, I also 
removed it completely. Also, it is not statistically significant in any of the four models. I 
kept it in the autoregressive model because the t-score was higher than one and controls 
for year-to-year error.  
I now turn to the independent variables of interest. Term limits are strongly 
associated with lobbyists and contributions when controlling for other factors. The term 
limit coefficients are also in the hypothesized direction. Term limits are significantly 
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associated with campaign contributions and lobbyists, with term limits being positively 
associated with both lobbyists and contributions. The residuals are also symmetrically 
distributed about the predicted values. Therefore, term limited states tend to have more 
lobbyists and have higher amounts of campaign contributions than non-term limited 
states. 
Discussion 
Influence is very difficult to measure and determining whether or not a lobbyist 
has influenced a legislator is even more difficult. The two best-known techniques that 
lobbyists use are campaign contributions and lobbying. Every individual running for a 
government office has to have funds for campaigning, and the majority of funds are not 
from individual citizens. The fastest way to get a large amount of money is to receive a 
donation from a group. Interest groups are willing to give large amounts of money to 
candidates because they consider this as an investment (Hamm 1983; Potters and Sloof 
1996). Contributions are the initial way that interest groups build relationships with and 
influence legislators. They increase trust between an interest group and a candidate 
(Hamm 1983). I, and others, argue that campaign contributions influence politicians.  In 
some cases, campaign contributions have been shown to have a significant influence on 
voting behavior (Potters and Sloof 1996; Nownes and Freeman 1998).  However, this is 
not always the case and some argue that campaign contributions do not have an impact. 
Sometimes contributions have no impact on how a legislator is going to vote (Potters and 
Sloof 1996; Nownes and Freeman 1998).  
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The best way to measure influence has not been decided upon; however, the most 
common ways lobbyists try to influence the legislature have been determined. Lobbyists 
say their most common activities are contacting legislators and making contributions 
(Nownes and Freeman 1998). It would be unfeasible to accurately document how many 
times a lobbyist communicates with a legislator so, in replace of that, I use the number of 
lobbyists, as do others (Hamm 1983; Nice 1984; Nownes and Freeman 1998; Potters and 
Sloof 1996). Interest groups cannot make legislators vote a certain way nor value certain 
ideals, but they can offer incentive to do those things. The act of lobbying is to persuade a 
person to do something, and that is why I use the most common activities of lobbyists as 
my measure of interest group influence. I hypothesize that those two activities will be 
more widespread in term limited states.     
Term limits have impacted states in many different ways and this analysis shows 
that they have increased interest group influence. Senator Daggett (2005) saw the 
changes that were occurring in state legislatures and noticed that lobbyists were being 
relied on more heavily than they had been in the past. The number of lobbyists coming to 
the offices was increasing and policy information was being provided by lobbyists 
instead of senior legislators (Daggett 37). Similarly, my analysis has shown that lobbyists 
are more prevalent in term limited states. This may be because new legislators are 
inexperienced and must seek out information from any available source (Flake 2004; 
Bennett 2005; Kurtz, Cain, and Neimi 2007). On the other hand, some argue that 
freshman legislators do not trust lobbyists (Rockefeller 2005; Kurt, Cain, and Niemi 
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2007). New legislators will be more likely to ignore lobbyists because they are more 
concerned with constituent issues (Tabarrok 1994; Kurtz, Cain, and Niemi 2007). 
However, surveys given to legislators show more legislators seek out lobbyists for 
information than before term limits (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2004; Kurtz, Cain, and 
Niemi 2007). This does not mean that lobbyists have actually influenced the decision 
making of legislators. Nevertheless, my study reinforces the testimony of the senators 
that lobbyists are more prevalent in term limited states.  
My results also show that term limited states have higher levels of campaign 
contributions. This may be because term limited legislators are having to increase their 
campaign resources to run for higher office (Pomper and Weiner 2003, 122). Likewise, 
an increase in the amount of money contributed was seen after term limits were 
implemented (Sarbaugh-Thompson 2007). If a legislator desires a career as a politician in 
a term limited state than he or she will have to run for higher office, so the increase in 
campaign contributions is logical. My study also reinforces the idea that contributions 
have increased in term limited states.  
Conclusion 
 The problems with doing quantitative research on term limits have been the 
difficulty finding data across states over time and the fact that term limits were enacted in 
different years and impacted states in different years. Some of the states have not had 
their legislators removed from office yet, and others have only very recently had 
legislators termed out. The effects of term limits in the states that have only recently been 
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impacted may not have been felt yet. Also, states have varying disclosure laws. Some 
states only report even years, while some only report lobbyists’ activity week by week. 
Many states do not report data in an easily accessible way and several states do not 
archive the data.  
These are only some of the many reasons why political scientists do so few 
quantitative analyses of states nationwide. Term limits are even more problematic and the 
literature that has been written, thus far, is incomplete because a large amount of it only 
examines the theoretical implications of term limits. However, what does exist is limited 
in its scope because nearly all of them only look at how term limits affect the institutional 
composition and effectiveness, instead of whether or not the mechanism has 
accomplished the task the citizens created it to do.  There are still several shortcomings 
with this analysis and as term limits impact more states, hopefully, the many 
consequences left undiscovered will be noticed.  It does try to delve into an aspect of 
term limits that has yet to be fully examined.  It also provides an example of the 
differences between term limited states and non-term limited states; though, it is still 
unknown whether or not term limits have actually caused the increase in lobbyists and 
contributions.  
Both of the dependent variables were statistically significant. However, one 
shortcoming would be the fact that only two variables were used to measure interest 
group influence. More variables should be included to measure influence and more states 
should be added.  The number of ex-legislators should be added to measure lobbyists 
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influence because they are more trustworthy than traditional lobbyists. The number of ex-
legislators that become lobbyists increases every year and their influence is much greater 
than anyone could have imagined (Bogardus 2006). However, this information is not 
readily available.  Also, the number of bills authored by an interest group or lobbyist that 
are introduced into the legislature would be a useful measure of influence. Authoring 
legislation is a very common activity of an interest group (Nownes and Freeman 1998) 
and if that legislation was adopted by a legislator it would show that the interest group 
persuaded him or her to submit it. This information is even harder to obtain than the 
revolving door numbers, although it would be an excellent measure.  It would also be 
difficult to obtain that information from every state and for every year that should 
included it an analysis.  
It is difficult to measure influence and determine whether or not interest groups 
actually change the behavior of government officials. It is easy to list the activities 
engaged in but difficult to know if those activities make a difference. The limitation with 
my research is that I may not be measuring influence. If neither variables are a good 
measure of influence than it is still unknown whether or not term limits have increase 
lobbyists influence. However, term limited states do have higher levels of contributions 
and more registered lobbyists. 
Another shortcoming would be the fact that I only used 24 states and six years in 
my analysis. A complete analysis should include all states and more years. Some of the 
states I used were much larger than other states. California is a term limited state and 
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would clearly have more lobbyists than other states in the nation. This may skew the 
results; however, I did include Texas as a non-term limited state. Other control variables 
also need to be added. The economic variables were not very significant. Median income 
was only significant in the auto regressive model and unemployment was not significant 
in any of the models. This could mean that economic variables have no impact. Because 
term limits are political, more political variables need to be controlled for. Midterm 
elections were not at all significant and the percent Republican was only slightly so. On 
the other hand, the social variables were significant. 
Once term limits have impacted all of the states a thorough examination can be 
conducted. Before term limits had actually impacted the majority of states, political 
scientists were hypothesizing the consequences. As a result, term limits are not yet 
understood. Term limits need to be explored to determine if those hypothesized effects 
actually happened and what the other effects were.  Focus needs to be placed on the 
actual impact that term limits have made.  In only a few more years all of the states with 
term limits will have been impacted and it is unknown whether or not term limits have 
been a positive addition to state legislatures. Political scientists should continue to study 
term limits if they are going to understand the consequences and understand how they 
have impacted state legislatures. 
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